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We study an abstract representation of the learning process, which we call learning se-
quence, aiming at a constructive interpretation of classical logical proofs, that we see as
learning strategies, coming from Coquand’s game theoretic interpretation of classical logic.
Inspired by Gold’s notion of limiting recursion and by the Limit-Computable Mathematics
by Hayashi, we investigate the idea of learning in the limit in the general case, where both
guess retraction and resumption are allowed. The main contribution is the characteriza-
tion of the limits of non-monotonic learning sequences in terms of the extension relation
between guesses.
© 2008 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
A logical proof is constructive if it embodies a description of somewitness of its thesis, which e.g. in case of0
2
statements
is a computable function. This fails when non-constructive proofmethods are allowed. However, if we relax the effectiveness
requirement about the proof content asking for an effective search method of learning the witness of a proved statement,
we conceive amore powerful notion of constructive content. Indeed the shift from algorithms to effective learning processes
is a longstanding and fascinating proposal underlying research work to extract constructive content from non-constructive
proofs.
In his seminal papers [17,18], Gold introduced the idea of learning in the limit: a function or a language is learnable in the
limit if we can identify a correct grammar or a correct program bymeans of an inﬁnite sequence of “guesses” at the grammar
or at the program, that are correct from some step on (called Ex-learning in the literature). The mathematical notion used
here is that of the limit of a sequence in a discrete topology, which exists if and only if the sequence stabilizes. Gold justiﬁed
his concept of learning by the fact that a learner does not need to know when her guess is correct; rather it sufﬁces to know
that she will be acting correctly after some ﬁnite time.
Since then, learning in the limit has been largely exploited in the studies of machine learning theory, e.g. [11,3] where
it is called inductive inference, and it is still considered as a cornerstone in the ﬁeld. More recently Hayashi [19] shows
that Gold’s view of learning is suitable to interpret certain non-constructive arguments in mathematics. He observes that
Hilbert’s celebrated basis theorem as well as many other relevant mathematical results have been proved by means of non-
constructive arguments, which although are good examples of learning in the limit. Therefore it makes sense to speak of
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Limit-Computable Mathematics as a reasonable widening of constructive mathematics, especially in view of applications to
interactive and semi-automatic tools for theorem proving.
A limitation of the approach, however, lays in the use of negative information. When the “learner” thinks that her latest
guesses have been wrong, her only possibility is to backtrack to some previous stage and to forget deﬁnitely about the
retracted guesses (see [17], page 33, proof of theorem 1). This introduces a dramatic simpliﬁcation in the structure of the
memory of the learner (just a stack), which is responsible for the limitation to 1-recursive problems, or equivalently to 0
2
sets, as it was clearly recognized in Gold’s work.
A natural extension of learning in the limit can be achieved by means of iterated limits, as introduced in [26]. In [14] it is
proved that for all k,0
k+1 sets coincide with k-limiting recursive sets, namely sets whose characteristic function is deﬁnable
by k-iterated limits of some total recursive function. The problem with such an extension is that iterated limits completely
blur the structure of computation, which is in the end a brute force searching algorithm, and so not a candidate for the
interpretation of proofs, which include instead ingenuous search methods.
Theconceptof a strategy in the learningactivityhas itsnatural setting ingametheory. ItwasLorenzenwhoﬁrstproposed in
[22] to see logical formulas as games, and proofs aswinning strategies. The idea, grown through theworks of Lorenz, Hintikka
andmany others (see e.g. [16]), has been used in [13] by Coquand to provide a new interpretation of the ﬁnitist standpoint in
arithmetic. Now, if we look at the notion of debate and at the example 2.4 on page 330 of [13], we feel fully entitled to say that
the winning strategy for the formula ∃y  x∀z  x.f (y) f (z) (where f is some function on integers given as a parameter)
is actually a strategy learning a function which yields a y depending on x.
A breakthrough in the study of games and strategies in logic and computer science has been the solution of the full
abstraction problem for PCF [2,21,23], derived from the game theoretic analysis of Linear Logic [10,1], and from earlier
Kleene’s and Gandy’s work on computable functionals (see [21] for an historical reconstruction and references). In this
context, as well as in that of Coquand’s work [12,13], plays have been modeled by pointing sequences: each new move in a
play has in fact a pointer to some previous move, in such a way that the new move “is justiﬁed” by the previous move. It is
this pointer structure that deﬁnes the view of each player in a play at a given stage, which in turn is all the information at
disposal of the players to decide their next move (a property of strategies called “innocency” in [21]). By looking at the move
sequence as the successive guesses of a learner, and by retaining the pointer structure only, we get a picture of the memory
of the learner in the learning process, arriving at the concept of learning sequencewe investigate in the present paper.
According to this model, a learning process is some countable sequence of guesses indexed over natural numbers (the
time). It is equippedwith a regressive function f , telling for each time xwhich is the last guess of a sequence extended by the
guess at x. For historical reasons we sometime use the game theoretic terminology by speaking of the “justiﬁcation” relation
in a sequence, though itsmeaning here is different, since a guess at time x actually “extends” the entire line of thought ending
with the guess at f (x), and it is not in general a reply to it, nor it is authorized by that position in a game. Now if any guess in
a sequence just extends its immediate predecessor, then we say that the process is retraction-free. Otherwise the learner is
allowed to backtrack to some guess earlier than the immediate predecessor, implicitly retracting all intermediate guesses.
If we impose that the guess to which the learner goes back has not been itself retracted, then we have the same situation as
Gold’s learning in the limit, which is calledmonotonic learning in the literature. If instead retraction is not deﬁnite and guess
resumption is allowed so that we can suppress some previous retractions, then learning is non-monotonic, and the model
is much more powerful and complex. Following [8] we say that a learning process is 0-backtracking if it is retraction-free;
1-backtracking (speaking also of “simple backtracking”) if no retracted guess is ever resumed; α-backtracking for α > 1 in
the general case.
The problem we face is then: which is the proper notion of limit in the case of an inﬁnite learning sequence in which
the same guess can be retracted and resumed inﬁnitely many times? This question is clearly preliminary to any further
investigation, and it is quite challenging. Our understanding of the limit of a learning sequence is the sequence which is
obtained by repeatedly removing all guesses which are deﬁnitely retracted. This removal can be analyzed into several stages,
which we formalize via a reduction relation. This is not an elementary concept; indeed (identifying guesses with time) the
removal of a retracted guess x can make another guess y removable, e.g. in the case y is retracted and x is the only guess
resuming y: after removing x, the guess y is retracted and never resumed, so that y becomes removable. Indeed the removal
of a guess might require the removal of inﬁnitely many other guesses before. We prove however that the limit of a learning
sequence always exists and that it is unique; moreover the reduction of a sequence attains its limit, providing a motivation
for the latter deﬁnition.
We further investigate the structure of limits, by discovering that the notions of active and inactive edges, corresponding
to established and retracted guesses, respectively, make sense even in the inﬁnite case. In this latter case a third possibility
exists, namely of those guesses which are neither retracted nor resumed deﬁnitely no matter how many other guesses are
removed;we call themunstable. The good limits are then such that the set of unstable guesses is empty, so that only deﬁnitely
approved guesses are left in the sequence, which represents the learned object. This leads to a relation, we call the “undo”
relation, whichwe prove to bewell founded if and only if there are no unstable guesses. In such a case theminimumordinal α
needed in the deﬁnition of active and inactive edges expresses ameasure of the logical complexity of the learning processes.
Indeed there should be a relation between the ordinal α and the logical complexity of the set which is described by the limit.
When α = 1, our notion of limit clearly coincides with Gold’s notion of limit, which is 1-backtracking, which in turn can be
seen as a description of 0
1
sets. Also there should be a correspondence between the ordinal α (when it is ﬁnite) and iterated
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Fig. 1. Initial segment of a pointing sequence.
limits in the sense of Schulte, and hence the arithmetical hierarchy by the result in [14]. In general we conjecture that the
limits without unstable guesses are exactly the1
1
-sets: if this is the case, then the ordinal α is a possible answer to the quest
for a complexity measure of inﬁnite learning processes found in [14], going even behind the arithmetical sets.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we introduce learning sequences in which we abstract from the nature of
the elementswe are learning. Pointing sequences are actually interpretable as possibly inﬁnite plays of any of the formalisms
proposed in the game theoretic investigations of logic mentioned above. Because of this we treat here and in the subsequent
Sections 3 and 5 just of pointing sequences, while the interpretation in terms of learning processes is proposed in Section
4 to make explicit the motivation of our work, and to illustrate applications of the concept of limit through examples. We
then establish our main results in Section 6, where the structure of limits is characterized in terms of the undo relation. We
report on related works in Section 7 and eventually conclude in Section 8.
2. Pointing sequences
We think of the elements of a sequence s0s1s2 . . ., possibly inﬁnite, as “guesses” of a learning process. We restrict our
attention to countable sequences. A pointing structure is a backward mapping f over the indexes, relating each element si
but the ﬁrst one to some previous element sf (i). We think of the guess si as some “extension” of the list of guesses sf (i), sf 2(i), . . .
(here listed in the opposite order w.r.t. their indexes) . We also imagine that all guesses in between sf (i) and si are “retracted”
at the step i. In this section the central notion is pointing sequence, inwhichwe focus on the pointer structure of the sequence,
so that the actual nature of the elements si is immaterial.
Deﬁnition 2.1 (Countable pointing sequences). A countable pointing sequence is a pair (X , f ) such that:
(i) X ⊆N is a non-empty set ordered by the restriction of the ordering overN;
(ii) f :N \ {0} →N, is a mapping such that f (x) < x for all x /= 0, and the image of X \ {0} under f is included in X (in which
case we also say that X is f -closed).
When f (x) = ywe say that x extends y. We call the tree of (X , f ) the tree of domain X , having root 0 and as father/child relation
the extension relation.
Countable pointing sequences are just “pointing sequences” in the rest of the paper. X is the set of indexes. Since it helps
to think of X as a straight line, we sometime call its elements points.We take as set of indexes subsets and not initial segments
ofN, in order to ﬁx a linear ordering of indexes and to avoid a tedious re-indexing of a sequence when subtracting some of
its “points”.
If we interpret f (x) as the parent of x, then (X , f ) is just a tree (whence the deﬁnition of the tree of a sequence); however
the relevant facts about a pointing sequence concern the interplay between the linear (or “chronological”) ordering of the
indexes and the tree ordering induced by the “extension relation” f (x) = y. To ﬁx terminology and notation: given x ∈ X \ {0},
we call the pair (f (x), x) the edge from x, or just “the edge x” for short (we can think of any x > 0 in X both as an edge and as
a point). We write:
]f (x), x[X = {y ∈ X | f (x) < y < x}
for the interior of the edge from x. We say that an edge x is empty if its interior is, i.e., if f (x) = x − 1. We represent edges by
curved lines, or by straight lines if their interior is empty, as shown in Fig. 1. We shall also use the notations [f (x), x]X = {y ∈
X | f (x) y  x} and [f (x), x[X= {y ∈ X | f (x) y < x}. The subscript X will be omitted when it is clear from the context.
Deﬁnition 2.2 (Crossing Edges). In a pointing sequence (X , f )we say that an edge from y ∈ X crosses the edge from x ∈ X , and
we write yx or xy, if
f (x) < f (y) < x < y,
which is in a picture:
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Fig. 2. A sequence with two threads of maximal length.
By deﬁnition yx if and only if y > x and f (y) ∈ ]f (x), x[ . If either x = f (y) or y = f (x), instead, we say that the edges x, y
are adjacent. If [f (x), x] ∩ [f (y), y] = ∅ we say they are disjoint. For any two edges x 	= y, we distinguish the mutual positions
of x, y into three disjoint situations.
Lemma 2.3. Given two edges x, y of (X , f ), with x < y, all possible mutual positions of x, y are:
(i) [f (x), x] ⊂ [f (y), y[ (x is strictly included in y) :
(ii) [f (x), x] 	⊆ [f (y), y[, but x ∈ ]f (y), y[ (hence yx) :
(iii) [f (x), x] ∩ [f (y), y] ⊆ {x} (hence x, y are adjacent or disjoint) :
Proof. Immediatebydeﬁnition.We just remarkw.r.t. usual interval inclusionover the real line, that thesituation [x′, x] ⊂ [y′, y]
with x = y is impossible, since in our setting we would have x′ = f (x) = f (y) = y′. 
Assume that (X , f ) is a pointing sequence, and denote by f i the i-time self composition of f ; f 0 is just identity. Then the
sequence of powers f i(x) is strictly decreasing and it ends in 0:
0 = f i(x) < · · · < f 2(x) < f (x) < x
We call this sub-sequence “the thread of x”. Intuitively, each thread is a different line of thoughtwithin a learning process.
Deﬁnition 2.4. (Thread). Let (X , f ) be any pointing sequence.
(i) If x ∈ X , then the thread of x in (X , f ) is 0 = f i(x) < · · · < f 2(x) < f (x) < x.
(ii) Any Y ⊆ X is a thread of X if Y is ﬁnite and equal to the thread of its last element, or Y is inﬁnite and all its ﬁnite initial
segments are threads.
(iii) When Y = X we say that X itself is a thread.
(iv) If y is in the thread of x − 1 but not in the thread of x, then we say that y is retracted by x.
(v) If y is in the thread of x but not in the thread of x − 1, then we say that y is resumed by x.
As an immediate consequence of the deﬁnition, a thread is f -closed, therefore it is a sub-sequence of (X , f ). A thread
is a pointing sequence in which each point extends the point immediately before, therefore threads included in (X , f ) are
exactly the branches of the tree of (X , f ). Pointing sequences are not single threaded in general, exactly as trees are not single
branched in general.
Fig. 2 illustrates a case of a sequence with two maximal threads, namely {0, 3} and {0, 1, 2, 4, 5}. The latter might be
considered as the main thread of the sequence since it originates with the last element: intuitively, this thread is a line of
thought prevailing on all the other ones within the learning process. We face the problem of extending such a notion of the
“main” thread to the inﬁnite case, leading to the notion of limit (see Section 3).
By deﬁnition, if y retracts x then x does not belong to the same thread of y, so that if y belongs to the main thread, x does
not. On the other hand if y retracts x but y does not belong to themain thread, it is still possible for x to be in themain thread,
provided that y is itself retracted by some z in the main thread. This is, indeed, the case of x = 2, y = 3, z = 4 in Fig. 2. In this
case, according to our deﬁnition, we say that x is resumed by z. An edge y retracting some x can be “inactivated” by some
other edge z crossing it; but y can be “activated” if some other edge t crosses z, and consequently y retracts x at time t once
again. If X is inﬁnite, this might happen inﬁnitely many times. This is why it is so difﬁcult to deﬁne the limit as the “main
thread” of an inﬁnite X . In order to solve the problem, we introduce two sets of edges, namely active and inactive, inspired
by the situation in Fig. 2. Active and inactive edges are deﬁned by mutual recursion: an edge is active if all edges crossing it
are inactive, and inactive if some edge crossing it is active. Formally:
Deﬁnition 2.5. (Active and Inactive Edges). Given a pointing sequence (X , f ) the sets of active and inactive edges of X , are,
respectively:
AX = {x ∈ X | ∀y ∈ X (yx ⇒ y ∈ IX )},
IX = {x ∈ X | ∃y ∈ X (y ∈ AX &yx)}.
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Fig. 3. Active and inactive edges in the ﬁnite case.
When X is ﬁnite, a backward induction shows that AX and IX are well deﬁned. In the example in Fig. 3 the active edges
are 4 and 2. The edge 4 is active since it is the last one, hence no edge can cross it. The edge 2 is active since, even if 32,
we also have 43, therefore the edge 4 “inactivates” 3, thus 3 does not “inactivate” 2 any more. According to the proposed
deﬁnition, the last edge (if any) is always active; by backward induction we can also prove that we have deﬁned a partition
of all edges of a ﬁnite (X , f ) into a set A of active edges and a set I of inactive ones.
In the next section we will deﬁne the limit of an inﬁnite pointing sequence (X , f ) as the set of points which are not in the
interior of any active edge. But before that, we have to deﬁne the sets AX , IX of active and inactive edgeswhen X is inﬁnite.We
use Knaster-Tarski ﬁxed point theorem. First of all, let us consider the structure (P(X) × P(X),), where is componentwise
inclusion. It is a complete lattice, where sups are (arbitrary) componentwise unions, and infs (arbitrary) componentwise
intersections. Let us deﬁne the operator  : P(X) × P(X) → P(X) × P(X) by (A, I) = (A′, I′) where
A′ = {x ∈ X \ {0} | ∀y ∈ X( yx ⇒ y ∈ I)},
I′ = {x ∈ X \ {0} | ∃y ∈ X( yx∧∧y ∈ A)}.
 is easily seen to be monotonic w.r.t. , hence by Knaster-Tarski theorem  has a least ﬁxed point that deﬁnes (AX , IX ),
even when X is inﬁnite.
Unravelling this construction, we write the following more explicit deﬁnition, which will be of use in the technical
development of Section 3:
Deﬁnition 2.6 Let (X , f ) be a pointing sequence; we deﬁne by mutual induction, the families {AXα }α∈Ord and {IXα }α∈Ord of
subsets of X as follows:
AXα = {x ∈ X \ {0} | ∀y ∈ X( yx ⇒ y ∈ IX<α)},
IXα = {x ∈ X \ {0} | ∃y ∈ X( yx∧∧y ∈ AX<α)},
where IX<α =
⋃
β<α I
X
β and similarly for A
X
<α . Then we set
(AX , IX ) = (AXα , IXα ),
where α ∈ Ord is the minimal one such that (AXα , IXα ) = (AX<α , IX<α), if any.
We say that AX and IX are the set of active and of inactive edges in X , respectively.
Let us see the ﬁrst terms of the series {AXα }α∈Ord and {IXα }α∈Ord :
AX0 ={x ∈ X \ {0} | ∀y ∈ X( yx ⇒ y ∈ IX<0)}
={x ∈ X \ {0} | ∀y ∈ X( yx ⇒ y ∈ ∅)}
={x ∈ X \ {0} | ∀y ∈ X( y 	x)}
since IX
<0
=⋃β<0 IXβ = ∅. Inwords,AX0 is the set of edges such that no other edge (nomatterwhether active or inactive) crosses
them.
Since AX
<0
= ∅ and the deﬁnition of IX
0
asks for the existence of some edge y ∈ AX
<0
, we immediately have IX
0
= ∅. This
implies AX
1
= AX
0
, but
IX1 ={x ∈ X | ∃y ∈ X( yx∧∧y ∈ AX<1)}
={x ∈ X | ∃y ∈ X( yx∧∧y ∈ AX0 )}
needs not to be empty, and indeed it is the set of those edges which are inactivated by edges, which are not crossed by any
other edge. Since IX
1
can be non-empty, any edge which is inactivated by some edge in IX
1
, will be in AX
2
\ AX
1
. We now check
that the two deﬁnitions of active and inactive edges coincide.
Proposition 2.7 Given any pointing sequence (X , f ), the pair (AX , IX ) exists, is (AX<α , I
X
<α) for some countable ordinal α, and it
coincides with the least ﬁxed point of .
Proof. First observe that if α < β then both Aα ⊆ Aβ and Iα ⊆ Iβ : hence A<α =⋃β<α Aβ ⊆ Aα , and similarly I<α ⊆ Iα .
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Fig. 4. In this sequence the set of retraction free points is just RF = {1}.
As a consequence, the subsets Aα \ A<α of X are pairwise disjoint. Indeed, if α < β then Aα ⊆ A<β is disjoint with Aβ \ A<β .
Since X ⊆N is countable, only countably many sets Aα \ A<α are not empty. Thus, for some α0 < ω1 and all α ≥ α0 we have
Aα \ A<α = ∅, hence Aα = A<α . By a similar reasoning, for some β0 < ω1 and all β ≥ β0 we have Iβ = I<β . Therefore if we take
γ0 = max(α0,β0), we obtain (Aγ0 , Iγ0 ) = (A<γ0 , I<γ0 ).
To see that (Aγ0 , Iγ0 ) is the least ﬁxed point of , deﬁne 
<α by:
<0 = (∅, ∅)
<α+1 = (<α)
<λ = ⊔β<λ <β for limit λ.
andα as<α+1. Now the least ﬁxed point of isβ where β is the least ordinal such thatβ = <β . It is immediately seen,
by induction on α, that<α = (A<α , I<α) andα = (Aα , Iα) for any α.We conclude that (Aγ0 , Iγ0 ) is the least ﬁxed point of. 
As a matter of fact, since X ⊆N, we know that the minimal α such that AXα = AX<α has to be countable, hence α < ω1.
3. Limit of a pointing sequence
In the light ofDeﬁnition2.6 andProposition2.7weknowthat apointing sequence (X , f )might contain redundant informa-
tion, namely the interior of active edges.We call the interior of active edges the retracted part of the sequence, andwe extract
the “main thread” of the pointing sequence by eliminating this retracted part: we call the result the limit of the sequence.
We choose the limit terminology since our notion of limit turns out to be a generalization of the notion of limit by Gold [17].
Deﬁnition 3.1 (Limit). Given a pointing sequence (X , f ) with active-inactive sets of edges (AX , IX ), deﬁne:
(i) RFX = {x ∈ X \ {0} | ]f (x), x[ = ∅}, the set of retraction-free edges in X (i.e., the set of edges with empty interior),
(ii) UX = X \ (AX ∪ IX ∪ {0}), the unstable edges in X ,
(iii) RX =⋃x∈AX ]f (x), x[X the retracted part of X ,
(iv) LX = X \ RX the limit of X .
Unstable edges are neither active nor inactive. The limit LX of a sequence (X , f ) determines a new sequence: (LX , f LX ).
Indeed it is a well deﬁned pointing sequence since, as we shall see in Theorem 3.6, this set is f -closed. We write (LX , f LX )
simply as (LX , f ), or just LX when f is understood. We shall also drop the superscript X when it is clear from the context.
In the example in Fig. 4we have RF = {1} ⊂ {1, 3} = A, while I = {2}. Active and inactive edges do form a partition of X \ {0}
in the ﬁnite case, so that UX = ∅. However this is not true in general.
Lemma 3.2.
(i) No edge is both active and inactive: AX ∩ IX = ∅ for any (X , f ),
(ii) Assume in the step 0 of deﬁnition of AX we only get empty edges. Then all active edges are empty, and there is no inactive edge:
if AX
0
= RFX , then AX = RFX and IX = ∅.
(iii) There exists some inﬁnite (X , f ) such that UX /= ∅.
Proof.
(i) We show, by induction over α, that Aα ∩ Iα is empty for all α. Suppose that x ∈ Aα ∩ Iα: then x ∈ Iα implies that there
exists y such that yx and y ∈ A<α; since yx and x ∈ Aα , we also have that y ∈ I<α hence A<α ∩ I<α /= ∅. Since we know
that Aγ ⊆ Aβ and Iγ ⊆ Iβ whenever γ < β , this implies that there exists a β < α such that Aβ ∩ Iβ /= ∅, contradicting the
induction hypothesis on β.
(ii) By induction over α. If x ∈ Iα , then there exists y ∈ A<α such that yx; but this implies that x ∈ ]f (y), y[ , which contradicts
y ∈ A<α = RF. On the other hand if x ∈ Aα , then the induction hypothesis I<α = ∅ implies that y 	x for any y, that is x ∈ A0
and A0 = RF by hypothesis, and therefore Aα ⊆ RF by the arbitrary choice of x: since it is always the case that RF ⊆ Aα , we
conclude.
(iii) Take X =N and let f (1) = 0 and f (x) = x − 2 for all x ≥ 2. Then RFX = {1} = AX
0
, so that AX = {1}, IX = ∅ by 3.2 of this
lemma, and therefore UX =N \ ({0} ∪ AX ∪ IX ) =N \ {0, 1} = {x ∈N | x > 1}. 
In fact, we can check that if UX /= ∅, then UX itself is an inﬁnite subset of X .
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Lemma 3.3. Let U be the set of unstable edges of (X , f ). Then
∀x ∈ U ∃y ∈ U. yx.
Therefore if U 	= ∅ there exists a chain of inﬁnite cardinality x0x1x2 · · · in U.
Proof. If x ∈ U, then x 	∈ A ∪ I by deﬁnition of U. By deﬁnition of AX and IX it follows that ∃yx. y 	∈ I and ∀yx. y 	∈ A.
Thus, ∃yx. y 	∈ I ∪ A. From yx we have y > x, hence y 	∈ {0}, so that, by deﬁnition of U, it must be the case that y ∈ U. By
repeatedly applying this remark, if U /= ∅ we construct an inﬁnite sequence x0x1x2x3 · · · all in U. By deﬁnition of,
we have x0 < x1 < x2 < · · ·, therefore the elements of this chain are pairwise distinct. 
In the following, we aim at proving a kind of correctness theorem for the notion of limit, namely that (LX , f ) is always
a pointing sequence. We have only to prove that LX is f -closed, which is although not obvious because of the recursive
deﬁnitions of active and inactive edges. We ﬁrst establish two lemmas, in which we ﬁx the sequence (X , f ), writing just A, I
and U for AX , IX ,UX .
Lemma 3.4.
(i) If x ∈ A and xy or yx, then both y ∈ I and y 	∈ A ∪ U.
(ii) If x, y ∈ A, then the edges x, y are equal, or disjoint, or adjacent, or one strictly included in the other. Besides, x ∈]f (y), y[ ⇔
]f (x), x[ ⊂ ]f (y), y[.
(iii) If x ∈ A, then x is a maximal edge in A ⇔ x is in the interior of no y ∈ A.
Proof.
(i) If x ∈ A and xy then y ∈ I because of the deﬁnition of I; if instead yx then y ∈ I because of the deﬁnition of A. In both
cases we have that y 	∈ A by 3.2 of Lemma 3.2, and that y 	∈ U by Deﬁnition 3.1.
(ii) By Lemma 2.3 onmutual positions, and the fact that the previous point forbids both xy and yx. If x ∈]f (y), y[ then the
twoedges are different, neither disjoint nor adjacent, andwehave y 	∈]f (x), x[. The only possibility left is ]f (x), x[ ⊂ ]f (y), y[.
Conversely, if ]f (x), x[ ⊂ ]f (y), y[ then f (y) ≤ f (x) < x ≤ y, and x 	= y, therefore x ∈]f (y), y[.
(iii) By the previous point, if x, y ∈ A, then the edge x is strictly included in the edge y ⇔ the point x is in the interior of the
edge y. 
Lemma 3.5. Inactive edges are deﬁnitely retracted: I ⊆ R; the limit always includes the ﬁrst point: 0 ∈ L.
Proof. If x ∈ I then yx for some y ∈ A, namely x ∈ ]f (y), y[ : hence x ∈ R by Deﬁnition 3.1. On the other hand for no x ∈ X it
is the case that 0 ∈ ]f (x), x[ , otherwise f (x) < 0. Hence 0 ∈ L by deﬁnition of L. 
Theorem 3.6. If (X , f ) is a pointing sequence and LX is its limit, then (LX , f ) is a pointing sequence as well.
Proof. ByLemma3.5, L /= ∅. To see that it is f -closed, letx ∈ L andsuppose, towardacontradiction, that f (x) 	∈ L. Bydeﬁnitionof
Lweknow that f (x) ∈ ]f (y), y[ for some y ∈ A; since x ∈ Lwehave that x 	∈ ]f (y), y[ .We also know that x /= y, since f (x) /= f (y).
Therefore it must be the case that f (y) < f (x) < y < x, that is, xy. By Lemma 3.4 and the fact that y ∈ A, it follows that x ∈ I,
and hence x ∈ R by Lemma 3.5, namely x 	∈ L, contradiction. 
4. Pointing sequences and the learning process
The original motivation for developing the notion of limiting recursion in [17,18] was to model the learning process.
However the bare sequence of guesses considered by Gold, and representing the trace of all attempts by the learner, is
too sketchy to describe sophisticated learning strategies, because it only includes the chronological ordering on guesses,
and not also the “justiﬁcation” (or “logical”) ordering between guesses as we would like. In this section we propose learning
sequences (pointing sequenceswith eachpoint associated to a “guess”), inwhich the “justiﬁcation” orderingbetweenguesses
is modelled by the backward pointer of the underlying pointing sequence. In a sense, pointers model the “memory” of the
learner.
We move from the idea of Coquand’s game theoretic interpretation of arithmetic [12,13], in which pointing sequences
are used to model the interaction between Myself and Nature. Hence we borrow some of intuitions and terminology from
game theory, and see guesses as pairs of question/answers by the learner and the environment, respectively, more than as
putting forward a hypothesis.
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Deﬁnition 4.1 (Learning Sequence). A learning sequence is a triple (X , f , γ ) where
(i) (X , f ) is a pointing sequence, with f computable;
(ii) γ : X → G is a computable function associating points in X to guesses in G.
We think of X = {x0, x1, x2, . . .} as the time, which is discrete and linearly ordered, and of {γ (x0), . . . , γ (xn)}, with the
pointer structure described by f , as the state of memory at step xn of the learning agent we are modelling. At each instant
x ∈ X the learner produces her guess γ (x) ∈ G, and a pointer f (x) to the relative guess γ (f (x)); this extends the list of guesses
γ (0) = γ (f n(x)), . . . , γ (f 2(x)), γ (f (x)), γ (x) related to the thread of x, which is seen as a picture of the evidencesmotivating the
current guess of the learner, and her subsequent acts.
No speciﬁc assumptions are made about the set G of guesses but the concreteness of its elements, as both f and γ are
computable. We ask for the computability of f and γ to rule out non-realistic learners. In concrete examples f , γ are often
deﬁned by mutual recursion from their values on all y < x with y ∈ X .
Assume x is in the thread of y − 1. Then the crossing relation yx can be seen as the retraction of the guess γ (x) from
the thread of y (in case it was included in it). However, since the guess γ (y) can be itself retracted, for instance when
the edge from y becomes inactive, it is still possible for the guess γ (x) to be restored, provided that x is not inactivated
elsewhere. This mechanism is intended to model the ability of the learner to suspend her judgment about some line of
thoughts she had in the past, and possibly to resume it by changing her mind when this is suggested by some subsequent
evidence.
The examples by which we illustrate our interpretation all come from applications of proof theory to computer science.
Coquand [13] andHayashi [19] discovered that non-constructive existence proofs of classicalmathematics can be interpreted
as (highly non-trivial) learning algorithms. Similar algorithms were already considered by Duval and others in [15]. These
algorithms learn the object whose existence is stated in theorems, and their structure reﬂects the structure of the relative
proofs. Learning algorithms from proof theory are, as we could expect, quite different from learning processes in other
settings; nevertheless the underlying concepts are the same, up to a proper interpretation.
First in proofswe do not have guesses; rather their role is played by the hypotheses and their consequences. If a statement
depends on certain hypothesis, it can be interpreted as a guess which is consistent with a chain of previous guesses, with
the guess chain described by the justiﬁcation function.
Werewe about constructive reasoning only, each guesswould depend on the one immediately before, and learningwould
be nothing else than direct computation of a retraction-free stream of guesses. The primary goal of our paper is, instead, to
account for non-constructive reasonings that use the excluded middle principle, or equivalently the reductio ad absurdum.
When aproof uses reductio ad absurdum, oncewe arrive to a contradiction, this is viewed as a failure. The learner interpreting
the proof backtracks to the point immediately before to the point in which she guessed that the absurd hypothesis was true,
retracts all guesses depending on the absurd hypothesis, and guesses its negation. We say that the learner “has changed her
mind”.
To illustrate the concept of learning sequence and to see in which sense its limit might represent the object of learning,
we go through some examples.
4.1. Simple backtracking
According to [12], the act of backtracking to some previous guess is simple when the learner (there called “Myself”)
“never changes her mind about a value she has considered as wrong”. As an example of simple backtracking we consider
the winning strategy given in [12] for the formula ∃x∀y(A[x] ∨ A⊥[y]), where A⊥ is the dual of A and A is some decidable
formula of arithmetic.We rephrase this strategy as a learning sequence (N, f , γ ) as follows.We set γ (0) = ⊥, meaning: “don’t
know”. ⊥ is some guess which is put in the step 0 only to make retractable the ﬁrst meaningful guess (here the second
one). For all i > 0, γ (i) is a pair of natural numbers (ni,mi) against which we test the predicate A[ni] ∨ A⊥[mi]. We try to
guess some n such that ∀y.A[n] ∨ A⊥[y]. We start by guessing n = 0, and we produce a ﬂow (n,m) = (0, 0), (0, 1), (0, 2), . . . of
guesses to provide an evidence for ∀y.A[0] ∨ A⊥[y]. We proceed as long as A[n] ∨ A⊥[m] is true, with each guess justiﬁed by
the previous one. If A[0] is true or A[m] is false for all m, then A[0] ∨ A⊥[m] is always true, therefore the learning sequence
is ⊥, (0, 0), (0, 1), (0, 2), . . ., with all arrows directed to the point immediately preceding and therefore all (interiors of) edges
are empty. Otherwise, if A[0], . . . ,A[m0 − 1] are all false and A[m0] is true, then A[0] ∨ A⊥[m0] is the ﬁrst false formula we
found. In this case we backtrack to step 0 and we change n to 1, and we assume ∀y.A[n] ∨ A⊥[y] for this new n. We then
produce a new ﬂow (1, 0), (1, 1), (1, 2), . . . of guesses considered as an evidence for the truth of the formula ∀y.A[1] ∨ A⊥[y]. If
A[1] ∨ A⊥[m0] is the next false formula we ﬁnd, then we backtrack again to the step 0 and change n to 2, assuming this time
∀y.A[1] ∨ A⊥[y]. And so forth, until n = m0, therefore A[m0] ∨ A⊥[m] is true for all m. In this case we eventually produce an
inﬁnite ﬂow (m0, 0), (m0, 1), (m0, 2), . . . of guesses as an evidence of ∀y.A[m0] ∨ A⊥[y].
Of course this is not the most clever way to learn the truth of the given formula: think of a different strategy such that,
as soon as the m0 above is discovered starts immediately to produce the ﬂow (m0, 0), (m0, 1), (m0, 2), . . . But this is not our
point: we can represent both the former and the latter strategy, and although choosing among themwould lead to the same
limit, this is not the case in general.
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Fig. 5. A tentative learning sequence when s(2n + 1) = 1 and s(2n + 2) = 0 for all n.
Takingm = m0 − 1, a picture of the ﬁrst learning sequence is:
(0, 0), (0, 1), . . . , (0,m), (1, 0), (1, 1), . . . , (1,m), (2, 0), . . .
with a pointer from each guess (0, 0), (1, 0), (2, 0), . . . to ⊥, and all other arrows empty. Here is a picture of the learning
sequence, where we put labels representing guesses above their indexes:
Note that there are no crossing edges here, since the only possible backtracking are to point 0. Therefore all edges are
active and the limit is obtained by removing the interior of all edges. There exist only ﬁnitelymany backtracking steps, though
their number is in general not computable from A. There exists i > 0 such that for all j > i we have f (j) = j − 1 and the pairs
from point i up are (m0, 0), (m0, 1), (m0, 2), . . .:m0 is the ﬁrst x such that ∀y(A[x] ∨ A⊥[y]). Otherwise stated, the limit (in Gold
sense) of the sequence obtained by taking the ﬁrst coordinate of each pair exists and it ism0. On the other hand if we take the
limit of the learning sequence in our sense (see Def. 3.1), then we remove the interior of all edges, and we obtain the inﬁnite
sequence (m0, 0), (m0, 1), (m0, 2), . . .whose ﬁrst coordinate ism0. Formally, for all i > 0 γ (i) = (ai, bi) is deﬁned together with
f (i) as follows:
(i) a1 = b1 = 0, and f (1) = 0;
(ii) if A[ai] ∨ A⊥[bi] is true then ai+1 = ai, bi+1 = bi + 1 and f (i + 1) = i;
(iii) if A[ai] ∨ A⊥[bi] is false then ai+1 = ai + 1, bi+1 = 0 and f (i + 1) = 0.
Since A is decidable, both f and γ are computable total functions.
4.2. The constant subsequence principle
In the ﬁrst example of this section the retraction of a guess can be only deﬁnitive. The second example exhibits a subtler
and stronger use of backtracking than the ﬁrst one, namely the ability of the learner of changing her mind about previously
retracted guesses. In learning theory this ability is called non-monotonic learning.
By Proposition 2.7 there exists ameasure α of howmuch involved backtracking can be.When α = 1, the learner can decide
that she was wrong but cannot retract such a decision, and we speak of 1-backtracking; when α = 2, instead, the learner
can decide she was wrong in believing she was wrong, and we will speak of 2-backtracking, and so forth (see [8] for more
information about n-backtracking). We conjecture that if UX = ∅ then α is a recursive ordinal, and the 0
α+1 sets are exactly
the limits of learning sequences of complexity α and having UX = ∅.
As a second example we propose an interpretation of a simple but relevant classical principle, the constant subsequence
principle, which has been pointed out by Stolzenberg. This principle says that any inﬁnite recursive sequence s :N \ {0} →
{0, 1} has some inﬁnite constant subsequence, but we can restate it in many ways (see [6]). In combinatorics it is equivalent
to König Lemma for r.e. trees, and to the fact that every recursive sequence:N→N×N has someweakly increasing inﬁnite
subsequence. In Analysis, it is equivalent to the Subsequence Lemma for recursive sequences (every recursive sequence in
[a, b] has some convergent subsequence), to the Intermediate value Theorem for recursive continuous maps (if f : R → R
is continuous and f (a) < x < f (b), then x = f (c) for some c ∈ R), and to many others famous theorems (see [28]). All these
equivalences can be established by intuitionistic proofs though, clearly, none of these is a constructive principle.
Let us ﬁx any inﬁnite recursive sequence s; then we might express the constant subsequence principle as follows:
∀x∃y > x(s(y) = 0) ∨ ∀x∃y > x(s(y) = 1). (1)
A proof by contradiction is then obtained by observing that, if we negate (1) then there exists an x which is not followed
by 0’s nor by 1’s, which must be the last one of the inﬁnite sequence s.
For the sake of constructing a sequence learning s, let us tentatively consider (N, f , γ ), where γ is just s extended by
γ (0) = ⊥, and f (x) is the last y such that s(x) = s(y), and it is 0 if there is no such a y:
f (x) = max{y < x | y = 0 ∨ s(x) = s(y)}.
With this simple choice, however, it does not seem that a limit coinciding with s can be obtained in a similar manner
as in the previous example. Indeed if s(2n + 1) = 1 and s(2n + 2) = 0 for all n then the learning sequence has the shape
represented in Fig. 5.
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Fig. 6. CS(s) when s(2n + 1) = 1 and s(2n + 2) = 0 for all n.
This is unfortunate since all non-empty edges in the sequence are inactivated and resumed inﬁnitely many times, and in
fact they are unstable according to Deﬁnition 3.1. Therefore the limit is no meaningful object (in fact, it is just the original
sequence).
A proper solution takes a different attitude with respect to 0 and 1. We join two 0’s no matter how far they are, and two
1’s only if they are consecutive. Here is an example, in which no two 1’s are consecutive:
Of course the roles of 0 and 1 can be safely interchanged, but it seems that if we use sequential computations (as we do
by choosing sequences, because the time line is totally ordered) then some asymmetry is unavoidable, as ﬁrst remarked by
Stolzenberg and later in [4].
The learning sequence CS(s)wewill deﬁne is non-monotonic, that is, it is an example of 2-backtracking. The learner starts
with the hypothesis that there are inﬁnitely many 0’s. Whenever a 1 is met she retracts all previous guesses, and she starts
a new thread made of consecutive 1’s. But this is not deﬁnitive, since each time a new 0 is met she retracts deﬁnitively this
thread of 1’s, and resumes the hypothesis: “s has inﬁnitely many 0’s” , together with all previous 0’s in the sequence. This
reads as: “the learner thinks she was wrong in believing she was wrong about the existence of inﬁnitely many 0’s”. Here is
the formal deﬁnition:
Deﬁnition 4.2 Let s :N \ {0} → {0, 1} be an inﬁnite recursive sequence. Deﬁne CS(s) = (N, f , γ ) where γ is s extended by
γ (0) = ⊥, and
f (x) =
⎧⎨
⎩
max{y < x | y = 0 ∨ γ (y) = 0} if γ (x) = 0
x − 1 if γ (x) = γ (x − 1) = 1
0 if γ (x) = 1 but γ (x − 1) 	= 1.
Fig. 6 illustrates an initial segment of CS(s) in the case of s(2n + 1) = 1 and s(2n) = 0 considered above.
Using learning sequences we get a meaningful limit even in the case of a non-monotonic learning. For instance, in the
given example all edges are retracted, but only the edges labeled by 0 are resumed. More precisely for all n we have that
2n + 22n + 1 , while 2n + 1 crosses no edge, thus 2n + 2 is crossed by no edge. This means that 2n + 2 is active, while
2n + 1, being crossed by 2n + 2, is inactive. In other words we have A = {2n + 2 | n ∈N}, and the interior of each 2n + 2 ∈ A
is {2n + 1}. If we take as L the setN \⋃x∈A ]f (x), x[ , namely eliminate the interiors of all active edges which are all 2n + 1
for n ∈N, we get L = {2n|n ∈N}. L is exactly the subsequence of all 0’s (but for the ﬁrst value which is ⊥). This learning
sequence can be translated in term of limit iterated twice, but the result would be more involved and less natural.
For any recursive sequence s, the limit of the learning sequence is the subsequence of all 0’s if there are inﬁnitely many
0’s, while if this is not the case, it is the longest sufﬁx of smade only of 1’s.
4.3. Testing for totality
As a further illustration of the notion of 2-backtracking let ϕ : {x ∈N | x > 0} →N be some partial recursive function
from positive to non-negative integers, of the form ϕ(x) = μm.P(x,m) for some total recursive predicate P. We aim to deﬁne
a sequence learning the graph of ϕ if ϕ is total; otherwise the sequence will be the learning of the ﬁrst x such that ϕ(x)
is divergent. For example, P(x,m) ⇔ hm(x) = 1 where h(2x) = (2x)/2 = x and h(2x + 1) = 3(2x + 1) + 1 = 6x + 4. With the
given P the function ϕ is total if and only if Collatz’s conjecture about the 3x + 1 problem is true, while the ﬁrst x in which
ϕ(x) divergeswould be the ﬁrst counterexample to the conjecture, if any exists. To the time of writing, it is unknownwhether
Collatz conjecture holds, and therefore the limit of the learning sequence we construct exists in principle, but it is actually
unknown.
We deﬁne a learning sequence CL(P) = (N, f , γ ) associated to ϕ (or more properly to its intentional deﬁnition via P) much
in the sameway people try to ﬁnd some empirical evidence for or against Collatz conjecture by direct computation. At step 0
the learnermakes the emptyguess⊥ and thehypothesis thatϕ is total. At step1 she assumes the incompatible hypothesis that
ϕ(1) is undeﬁned. She maintains the latter as long as ¬P(1, 0),¬P(1, 1),¬P(1, 2), . . ., producing the ﬂow (1, 0), (1, 1), (1, 2), . . .
of guesses considered as an evidence of the current hypothesis. If and when somem1 is found such that P(1,m1) is true, she
knows that ϕ(1) = m1 converges. In such a case she retracts all guesses done before knowing that ϕ(1) = m1, and restores the
hypothesis that ϕ should be total. In the next step however, she retracts her hypothesis and the guess (1,m1) at the basis of
its likelihood, this time assuming that ϕ(2) is divergent, and keeping this as long as ¬P(2, 0),¬P(2, 1),¬P(2, 2), . . . Hence the
ﬂow of guesses (2, 0), (2, 1), (2, 2), . . . is generated to asses that ϕ(2) diverges. If andwhen somem2 is met such that P(2,m2) is
true, the learner knows that ϕ(2) = m2; she changes her mind once again reverting to the hypothesis that ϕ is total, and she
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Fig. 7. The learning sequence CL(P).
“justiﬁes” this by resuming the guess (1,m1) produced in advance. And so forth. This is 2-backtracking, because the learner
is able to believe “to be wrong believing that she was wrong” about the fact that ϕ is total.
The learning sequence CL(P) is depicted in Fig. 7, wherewe show the pointing structure by the arrows among the guesses.
This is the formal deﬁnition of CL(P). We deﬁne γ (0) = ⊥, and γ (x) = (a(x), b(x)) for all x > 0, with a(1) = 1 and b(1) = 0,
and we put for all x > 1:
γ (x) = (a(x), b(x)) =
{
(a(x − 1), b(x − 1) + 1) if ¬P(a(x − 1), b(x − 1))
(a(x − 1) + 1, 0) if P(a(x − 1), b(x − 1))
We deﬁne f (1) = 0 and for all x > 1:
f (x) =
⎧⎨
⎩
x − 1 if ¬P(a(x), b(x))∧∧¬P(a(x − 1), b(x − 1))
0 if ¬P(a(x), b(x))∧∧P(a(x − 1), b(x − 1))
max({0} ∪ {y | y < x∧∧P(a(y), b(y))}) if P(a(x), b(x))
Let T be the largest thread ⊥, (1,m1), (2,m2), . . . in CL(P) (we abuse terminology, identifying the sequence of guesses of
the points in a thread with the thread itself), such that each (i,mi) with i > 0 is followed by (i + 1,mi+1). If T is inﬁnite then
for all n > 1, each edge (n, 0) such that ¬P(n, 0) is crossed by some edge (n,mn) such that ¬P(n,mn) and therefore is inactive.
There is no other non-empty edge in the sequence, therefore by removing the interior of all edges of T we obtain T itself as
the limit of the sequence. T gives (but for its ﬁrst point ⊥) the graph of ϕ, and it is a witness of the fact that ϕ is total and the
Collatz conjecture is true.
Viceversa suppose that T is ﬁnite, ending in some (i,mi). Then the next guess (i + 1, 0) is part of some inﬁnite thread
D = ⊥, (i + 1, 0), (i + 1, 1), (i + 1, 2), . . . such that ¬P(i + 1, 0),¬P(i + 1, 1),¬P(i + 1, 2), . . . The edge from (i + 1, 0) to ⊥ is the
last non-empty edge, therefore it is active and it includes all non-empty edges, hence the limit of the sequence is obtained
by removing the interior of (i + 1, 0), and it is D itself. D is an evidence of the fact that ϕ(i + 1) is divergent and i + 1 is a
counterexample to Collatz conjecture.
Wedonotknow, today,whichof the twothreadsT orD is theactual limitofCL(P).Whatwehave is aneffective construction,
thought an implicit one, of the actual limit, which exists by a non-constructive argument.
5. Limits and normalization
There is a jump from (X , f ) to its limit (LX , f ), due to deﬁnition ofAX and IX which requires the Fixed Point Theorem. Tomake
this more concrete we introduce a normalization procedure, namely a process converging to LX . As it should be expected,
the complexity of the original X , which disappears in LX , is mirrored by the complexity of the normalization procedure.
The basic idea is that we get LX by progressively eliminating the interior of active edges x crossed by no edges, instead
of removing all of the interior of all active edges in a single step. We will check that this process preserves the structure we
have in X , that is, the f -closure of X and the original partition of edges of X into active, inactive and unstable. This process
is already considered in [13], where, indeed, the process of cut elimination repeatedly removes the interior of edges not
intersected by any other.
We formalize this procedure via a reduction relation → between learning sequences, which however should be un-
derstood as an equivalent deﬁnition rather than a computation of the limit. Indeed even the basic reduction step will be
inﬁnitary. This is ﬁrst due to the inﬁnitary nature of both X and LX in general; but also, andmore importantly, to the fact that
the deﬁnitions of AX and IX are not even arithmetical in general. As a matter of fact it would not be sensible to take as basic
reduction step the removal of the interior of an edge x ∈ AX because the logical complexity of the deﬁnition of the latter set
is 1
1
in general. We start instead by removing the interiors of all non-empty edges z ∈ AX
0
.
Deﬁnition 5.1 (Removable Interiors). The interior ]f (x), x[X of an edge in the pointing sequence (X , f ) is removable if it is
non-empty and x ∈ AX
0
.
To explain the last deﬁnition, we say that the (non-empty) interior of an edge x is removable if there exists no edge y such
that yx, that is, such that f (y) ∈ ]f (x), x[ and y 	∈ ]f (x), x[ . The effect of the removal of the interior of x is to step from (X , f )
to (X\ ]f (x), x[ , f ), which is a pointing sequence by construction. Fig. 8 is an example in which we remove the interior of the
edge 4.
We ask for the interior of a removable edge to be non-empty since otherwise X\ ]f (x), x[ is just X , in contrast to the idea
of strict one-step reduction which is introduced below.
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Fig. 8. Removable edges.
Deﬁnition 5.2 (Strict One Step Reduction). Let x = {xγ }γ<α ⊆N be any sequence, where α > 0 is an arbitrary ordinal; then
we say that a learning sequence (X , f ) reduces in one step to (Y ,h) w.r.t. x, written (X , f ) →x (Y ,h) if:
(i) h = f Y ,
(ii) ]f (xγ ), xγ [ is removable in X , for all γ < α,
(iii) Y = X \⋃γ<α ]f (xγ ), xγ [ .
Lemma 5.3. If (X , f ) is a learning sequence and (X , f ) →x (Y ,h) for some sequence x, then (Y ,h) is a learning sequence.
Proof. Immediate by deﬁnition: indeed if y ∈ Y then h(y) = f (y) and f (y) 	∈ ]f (xγ ), xγ [ for all xγ ∈ x since the interior of xγ is
removable: so h(y) ∈ Y = X \⋃γ<α ]f (xγ ), xγ [ . 
Since α > 0, the sequence x = {xγ }γ<α cannot be empty. Because of condition (5.2) of the above deﬁnition and Lemma 5.3,
in (X , f ) →x (Y ,h) we can forget about the function h, since h is just the restriction of f to Y . Henceforth we ﬁx a regressive
function f and just write X →x Y , assuming that X ,Y are f -closed sets. Moreover we write X → Y when X →x Y for some
sequence x.
In all examples of Section 4, the relation→ sufﬁces to reach the limit. However, this is not true in general. There is a simple
reason: like in a play with Mahjong tiles, the interiors of certain edges might become removable only after other interiors
have been removed. For instance in the case of Fig. 3 in Section 2 we have that the interior of 4 is removable, while that one
of 2 is not, because of 32. However once ]f (4), 4[ has been removed, no edge is crossing 2 any more, so that the interior
of 2 becomes removable in the next step.
The transitive closure of → solves the problem if X is ﬁnite, but not in general. In fact in the inﬁnite case there is no
upper bound to the number of edges inactivating an edge x only temporarily but not deﬁnitely. Therefore it could take
inﬁnitely many reductions to remove all edges temporarily inactivating x. This calls for the closure under transﬁnite chains
of reductions.
Deﬁnition 5.4 (Reduction). The reduction relation → among pointing sequences is the closure of → w.r.t.
(i) transitivity,
(ii) denumerable intersections of chains: if X = X0→ X1→ · · · for denumerably many Xi then X→
⋂
i∈ω Xi.
We ﬁrst check that reduction turns pointing sequences into pointing sequences.
Lemma 5.5. If X is f -closed and X → Y then Y ⊂ X , and it is f -closed; hence (Y , f ) is a pointing sequence.
Proof. That Y ⊂ X is an immediate consequence of the fact that if X → Y then X →x Y for some non-empty x. The proof
that Y is f -closed is by induction over the deﬁnition of → : the basis is Lemma 5.3; transitivity is obvious; for the case of
denumerable intersections of chains just observe that any intersection of f -closed sets is f -closed. 
In order to establish that reduction always attains the limit (Theorem 5.9), we prove the following claim: “if X→ Y , then
active and inactive edges of Y are the active and inactive edges of X which belong to Y”. We split this proof into two steps.
In Lemma 5.6, we check that the claim holds if Y is obtained out of X by removing the interior of edges which are active in
X (this proviso makes the statement much weaker). Then, in Lemma 5.7, we prove that, indeed, if X→ Y , then Y is obtained
out of X by removing the interior of edges which are active in X . We will conclude in Theorem 5.9, showing that the normal
form is the limit.
Lemma 5.6. Let Z ⊆ AX and Z* =⋃z∈Z ]f (z), z[ ⊆ RX a subset of the retracted part of X.Assume Y = X \ Z* is a pointing sequence.
Then:
(i) If x ∈ X is removed in Y , but the interior of x is not completely removed in Y , then the edge x is inactive: formally, if x ∈ Z* but
]f (x), x[	⊆ Z*, then x ∈ IX .
(ii) AYα ⊆ AX ∩ Y and IYα ⊆ IX ∩ Y , for all ordinal α.
(iii) If x ∈ X is active and removed in Y , then the interior of x is removed in Y : formally, if x ∈ AX and x ∈ Z* then ]f (x), x[ ⊆ Z*.
(iv) AXα ∩ Y ⊆ AYα and IXα ∩ Y ⊆ IYα , for all ordinal α.
(v) AY = AX ∩ Y and IY = IX ∩ Y.
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Proof.
(i) By deﬁnition if x ∈ Z* then x ∈]f (z), z[ for some z ∈ Z ⊆ AX . Either f (x) ≥ f (z), or f (x) < f (z). In the ﬁrst case f (z) ≤ f (x),
therefore ]f (x), x[ ⊂ ]f (z), z[ ⊆ Z*, contradicting the assumption ]f (x), x[ 	⊂ Z*. Thus, f (x) < f (z). From x ∈ ]f (z), z[ we
conclude zx. By assumption, z ∈ AX . We conclude x ∈ IX .
(ii) By induction on α. By induction hypothesis, for all β < α we have AYβ ⊆ AX ∩ Y and IYβ ⊆ IX ∩ Y . By deﬁnition unfolding of
AY<α , I
Y
<α , we deduce A
Y
<α ⊆ AX ∩ Y and IY<α ⊆ IX ∩ Y .
Let us ﬁrst prove that AYα ⊆ AX ∩ Y , for which it sufﬁces to show that AYα ⊆ AX . Assume y ∈ AYα ⊆ Y , in order to prove, for
all x ∈ X , xy, that x ∈ IX . If x ∈ Y , then, by deﬁnition unfolding of y ∈ AYα , we have x ∈ IY<α ⊆ IX ∩ Y ⊆ IX . If x ∈ X \ Y , then
x ∈ IX by y ∈ Y , y ∈]f (x), x[ (hence ]f (x), x[ 	⊂ Z*), and part (5.6) of this lemma. Therefore x ∈ IX in both cases.We conclude
y ∈ AXα .
It is also true that IYα ⊆ IXα ∩ Y , for which we just have to check that IYα ⊆ IX . Indeed if y ∈ IYα then, by deﬁnition unfolding,
there exists y′ ∈ AY<α such that y′y: now the fact that AY<α ⊆ AX ∩ Y ⊆ AX , just proved, immediately yields that y ∈ IX .
(iii) Assume for contradiction that x ∈ AX , x ∈ Z* but ]f (x), x[ 	⊆ Z*. Then by point (1) above we have x ∈ IX , contradicting (3.2)
of Lemma 3.2.
(iv) By induction on α. By induction hypothesis, for all β < α we have AYβ ⊇ AXβ ∩ Y and IYβ ⊇ IXβ ∩ Y , that is AY<α ⊇ AX<α ∩ Y and
IY<α ⊇ IX<α ∩ Y .
We claim that AYα ⊇ AXα ∩ Y . Indeed, if x ∈ AXα ∩ Y , then for all y ∈ Y , yx we have y ∈ IX<α since x ∈ AXα . By the fact that
y ∈ IX<α ∩ Y and IX<α ∩ Y ⊆ IY<α we conclude y ∈ IY<α . Thus, x ∈ AYα .
To ﬁnish the proof,we check IYα ⊇ IXα ∩ Y . If y ∈ IXα ∩ Y , then xy for some x ∈ AX<α , hence y ∈]f (x), x[. By x ∈ AX<α , y ∈]f (x), x[,
y ∈ Y (hence ]f (x), x[	⊆ Z*, and part (5.6) of this lemma, we deduce x 	∈ Z*, that is, x ∈ Y . Thus, x ∈ AX<α ∩ Y ⊆ AY<α . We
conclude y ∈ IYα .
(v) By points (5.6) and (5.6), using the fact: AYα = AY ,AXα = AX , IYα = IY , IXα = IX from some α on. 
We can now establish that active and inactive edges after a reduction are subsets of the active and inactive edges before
the same reduction.
Lemma 5.7. Assume X→ Y .
(i) Y = X \⋃z∈Z ]f (z), z[ for some ∅ 	= Z ⊆ AX .
(ii) AY = AX ∩ Y and IY = IX ∩ Y .
Proof.
(i) By induction over the length of the reduction of X→ Y . In the basic case X →z Y for a sequence z 	= ∅ of removable
points, so that Y = X −⋃z∈z ]f (z), z[ . By deﬁnition of→z , for any z ∈ z there exists no y ∈ X such that yz: hence z ⊆ AX
vacuously.
Suppose that X→ Y because X→ V and V→ Y for some V . By induction hypothesis we have:
V = X \⋃z∈Z1 ]f (z), z[ for some ∅ 	= Z1 ⊆ AX
Y = V \⋃z∈Z2 ]f (z), z[ for some ∅ 	= Z2 ⊆ AV .
Hence
Y = X \
⋃
z∈Z1∪Z2
]f (z), z[ .
By (5.6) of Lemma 5.6, AV ⊆ AX , therefore ∅ 	= Z1 ∪ Z2 ⊆ AX as desired.
In the last case X = X0 and Xi→ Xi+1 for all i ∈ ω, and Y =
⋂
i∈ω Xi. Repeating the same reasoning as in the previous
case, we know that Xi+1 = Xi \
⋃
z∈Zi ]f (z), z[ for some ∅ 	= Zi ⊆ AXi ⊆ AX by induction. If Z =
⋃
i∈ω Zi, then ∅ 	= Z ⊆ AX and⋂
i∈ω Xi = X \
⋃
z∈Z ]f (z), z[ .
(ii) By Lemma 5.6.5 and part (5.7) of this lemma. 
We then prove a lemma saying that a pointing sequence is irreducible if and only if all its active edges are empty.
Lemma 5.8. An f -closed set X is irreducible w.r.t. → if and only if AX = RFX .
Proof. The if part is just a rephrasing of Lemma 5.7. Indeed by contraposition if X→ Y then Y = X \⋃z∈Z ]f (z), z[ for some
Z ⊆ AX ; by Lemma 5.5 we know that Y ⊂ X , so that it must be the case that ]f (z), z[ /= ∅ for some z ∈ AX .
On the other hand if X 	→ Y for any Y , then ]f (z), z[ = ∅ for all z ∈ AX
0
, since otherwise X →z X\ ]f (z), z[ . This means that
AX
0
= RFX , which implies, by (3.2) of Lemma 3.2, that AX = RFX , and we are done. 
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Theorem 5.9. If X → Y and Y is irreducible, then Y = LX .
Proof. Recall that, by deﬁnition, LX = X \⋃x∈AX ]f (x), x[X . By Lemma 5.7, Y = X \⋃x∈Z ]f (x), x[X for some Z ⊆ AX . We deduce⋃
x∈Z ]f (x), x[X ⊆
⋃
x∈AX ]f (x), x[X , hence Y ⊇ LX .
To prove that Y ⊆ LX , suppose toward a contradiction that there is some y ∈ Y such that y ∈ ]f (x), x[X for some x ∈ AX . By
part (5.6) of Lemma 5.6, we deduce x ∈ Y . But AY = AX ∩ Y by (5.6) of the same lemma, so that x ∈ AY and y ∈ ]f (x), x[Y , which
contradicts Lemma 5.8 by the irreducibility of Y . 
We eventually conclude that reduction is a way to achieve the limit. In fact on one hand an irreducible X coincides with
its limit; on the other hand if X is reducible then the limit is the “normal form” of (X , f ), which then exists and is unique.
Corollary 5.10. For any learning sequence (X , f ) either X = LX and X is irreducible, or X→ LX .
Proof. If X = LX then all active edges are empty, that is AX = RFX . By Lemma 5.8, X is irreducible and we are done. Assume
X 	= LX . Then by deﬁnition of limit there exists x ∈ AX such that ]f (x), x[ ∩X 	= ∅; by Lemma 5.8, this implies that X is reducible.
We construct a sequence {Xi} such that X0 = X and either Xi→ Xi+1 or Xi is irreducible. If there exists such an irreducible
Xi (with i > 0) then X→ Xi by transitivity and we conclude that Xi = LX by the Theorem 5.9. Otherwise X→ Xω =
⋂
i<ω Xi
by denumerable intersection of chains. We can continue with Xω→ Xω+1, Xω+1→ Xω+2, …, and so forth. By deﬁnition of
reduction,N ⊃ X ⊃ X1 ⊃ X2 ⊃ X3 . . . ⊃ Xω ⊃ Xω+1 . . . A cardinality reasoning shows that, for some α < ω1, X→ Xα and Xα is
irreducible, so that Theorem 5.9 applies, and we conclude Xα = LX . 
6. A characterization of limits
In this sectionwe associate an ordinal to pointing sequences that can be understood as ameasure of their complexity and
we characterize the pointing sequences having a retraction-free limit (a “meaningful” limit, in a sense) as those for which
such a concept is well deﬁned. Recall that a pointing sequence having retraction-free limit can be interpreted as a learning
sequence reaching a stable form of knowledge in the limit.
The ordinal is 0 for retraction-free sequences, is 1 for monotonic learning; it is some ordinal α ≥ 2, for non-monotonic
learning having a retraction-free limit. When this measure is not well deﬁned, we obtain a limit with non-empty edges,
representing some “unstable” state of belief.
The ﬁrst step in our characterization is proving that if X→ Y , then UX = UY , that is, UX is invariant under reduction. We
start with some simple remarks. As a consequence of the results in Section 5 we have that if L = LX is the limit of a learning
sequence (X , f ) then AL = AX ∩ L = RFL and therefore IL = IX ∩ L = ∅. What about UL and UX? It would be easy to prove that
UL = UX ∩ L, but we will in fact prove the stronger statement that UL = UX . We ﬁrst check that the points of UX are not in
the retracted part of X .
Lemma 6.1. If x ∈ RX , that is, if x ∈ ]f (z), z[X for some z ∈ AX , then x 	∈ UX .
Proof. Toward a contradiction let x ∈ UX . By Lemma 3.3 there exists an inﬁnite chain x = x0x1 · · · all in UX . Since
]f (z), z[ is ﬁnite there exists a minimum i such that xi 	∈ ]f (z), z[ , which necessarily is greater than 0. By the choice of i, we
have xi−1 ∈ ]f (z), z[ , and xi ≥ z. We necessarily have xi > z, because xi = z contradicts xi ∈ UX and z ∈ AX . We claim that either
zxi−1, or xiz: in both cases we have a contradiction with Lemma 3.4, because xi, xi−1 ∈ UX , while z ∈ AX . If f (xi−1) < f (z),
thenby xi−1 ∈ ]f (z), z[ weconclude f (xi−1) < f (z) < xi−1 < z, that is, zxi−1. If f (xi−1) ≥ f (z) thenby xi−1 ∈ ]f (z), z[ wededuce
]f (xi−1), xi−1[⊂]f (z), z[. From xixi−1 we obtain f (xi) ∈]f (xi−1), xi−1[⊂]f (z), z[. From this latter and xi > z we conclude xiz,
the required contradiction. 
By deﬁnition unfolding, we are now in place to show that UX is invariant under reduction.
Proposition 6.2. If X→ Y then UX = UY .
Proof. By Lemma 5.6 we know that AY = AX ∩ Y and that IY = IX ∩ Y ; therefore
UY = Y \ ({0} ∪ AY ∪ IY )
= (X ∩ Y) \ (({0} ∩ Y) ∪ (AX ∩ Y) ∪ (IX ∩ Y)
= (X \ ({0} ∪ AX ∪ IX )) ∩ Y
= UX ∩ Y ,
hence UY ⊆ UX . Now we prove UX ⊆ UY . By Lemma 5.7, we have that Y = X \⋃z∈Z ]f (z), z[X for some Z ⊆ AX . If UX 	⊆ UY
then there exists x ∈ UX \ Y that is x ∈ ]f (z), z[X for some z ∈ AX , which is against Lemma 6.1.We conclude thatUX ⊆ UY , and
the proposition follows. 
We now formalize the idea of an edge inactivated by some another edge by a relation X over X we call the undo relation.
The measure of complexity of a learning sequence will be the ordinal height of X .
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Deﬁnition 6.3. (Inactivation). If x, y ∈ X , where (X , f ) is a pointing sequence, then we say that x is inactivated by y, or that y
undoes x, if yx, and if x was active right before y:
x X y ⇔ x ∈ A[0,y[X ∧ yx.
Note that, since y is active in [0, y]X , as it is its last element, if x X y then x ∈ I[0,y]X . Also observe that if there is a chain of
undo’s starting from x, then each new undo changes the state of x from “active” to “inactive” and conversely. If there is an
inﬁnite chain of undo’s ending in x, there is no obvious way of telling if x is active or inactive. Therefore it is reasonable to
conjecture the following: the unstable edges (neither active nor inactive) are exactly the edges x such that there is an inﬁnite
chain of undo’s starting from x; this will be the case for some x if the relation X is notwell-founded.
We prove ﬁrst that if X is a limit, then active edges are empty, inactive edges do not exist, and unstable edges, if any, are
non-empty.
Lemma 6.4. If X = LX then AX = RFX and IX = ∅.
Proof. In general (that is for any X) if ]f (x), x[X = ∅ then there exist no y ∈ X such that yx: it follows that x ∈ AX : therefore
RFX ⊆ AX .
On the other in the particular case when X = LX we have that AX ⊆ RFX = {z ∈ X | ]f (z), z[X = ∅} since X = LX =
(by deﬁnition)X \⋃z∈AX ]f (z), z[X .
Now from the fact that AX = RFX we conclude that for any x ∈ X there exists no y ∈ AX such that yx, since otherwise
x ∈ ]f (y), y[X , so that IX = ∅. 
Lemma 6.5. If X = LX then UX = {x ∈ X | ]f (x), x[X /= ∅}.
Proof. By Lemma3.3 if x ∈ UX then there exists y ∈ UX ⊆ X such that yx: hence f (y) ∈ ]f (x), x[X . Viceversa let ]f (x), x[X /= ∅;
the hypothesis that X = LX implies that AX = RFX and IX = ∅ by Lemma 6.4, hence x ∈ X \ ({0} ∪ AX ∪ IX ) = UX . 
Next we see that the unstable edges are exactly those belonging to some inﬁnite descending chain w.r.t. X , so that UX is
empty if and only if the latter relation is well-founded. We ﬁrst prove this when X is a limit.
Lemma 6.6. If X = LX then UX is the set of all x ∈ X such that there exists an inﬁnite descending chain x = x0 X x1 X x2 X · · · .
Proof. By Lemma 6.5 UX consists of the edges with non-empty interior. If x ∈ UX then by Lemma 3.3 there exists y such that
yx. Choose the ﬁrst such y: then x is crossed by no edge in [0, y[ ∩X , thus it is active in that interval and we have x X y.
On the other hand y ∈ UX since x ∈ ]f (y), y[X /= ∅ so that we can iterate the same reasoning building an inﬁnite descending
chain x = x0 X x1 X x2 X · · ·.
Viceversa if there exists such descending chain, then xx1, which implies that f (x1) ∈ ]f (x), x[X . Then x ∈ UX by Lemma
6.5. 
Then we aim to establish that Lemma 6.6 holds in the general case, namely also for non-limit X . We ﬁrst prove that
reduction commutes with restriction to certain ﬁnite preﬁxes of the given sequence X; then that it commutes w.r.t. the undo
relation, and eventually that it commutes with any inﬁnite chain of undo’s.
Lemma 6.7. Let y ∈ Y then:
(i) if X → Y then either X ∩ [0, y] = Y ∩ [0, y] or X ∩ [0, y] → Y ∩ [0, y], and y ∈ X ,
(ii) if X→ Y then either X ∩ [0, y] = Y ∩ [0, y] or X ∩ [0, y]→ Y ∩ [0, y], and y ∈ X.
Proof. Let us ﬁrst observe that X→ Y implies Y ⊆ X , hence y ∈ X .
To prove part (6.7) recall that the set of removable edges in X is just AX
0
, hence we know that
Y = X −
⋃
z∈Z
]f (z), z[X for some Z ⊆ AX0 .
The fact that y ∈ Y gives y 	∈ ]f (z), z[X for any z ∈ Z: hence either y  f (z) or z  y for all z ∈ Z . Let Z ′ = {z ∈ Z | z  y},
then if X ∩ [0, y] /= Y ∩ [0, y] we have Z ′ /= ∅ and
Y ∩ [0, y] = (X ∩ [0, y]) \
⋃
z∈Z ′
]f (z), z[ ,
where we note that X ∩ [0, y] is f -closed (for X = (X , f , v)) since X is such and [0, y] is an initial segment of N, so that it is
f -closed: the intersection of f -closed sets is f -closed. Now, because of Z ′ ⊆ Z ⊆ AX
0
, we conclude that X ∩ [0, y] → Y ∩ [0, y]
as desired.
Part (6.7) is proved by induction over the deﬁnition of → using part 6.7 as the basic case. Transitivity is straightforward.
Suppose that X = X0→ X1→ · · · for denumerably many Xi, and that Y =
⋂
i∈N Xi. By ind. hyp., for all i we have either Xi ∩
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[0, y]→ Xi+1 ∩ [0, y], orXi ∩ [0, y] = Xi+1 ∩ [0, y]. Assume that for some i equality does not holds. Then byﬁnite or denumerable
intersection of chains we have:
X ∩ [0, y]→
⋂
i∈N
(Xi ∩ [0, y]) = Y ∩ [0, y].
Assume equality holds for all i. Then we have: X ∩ [0, y] =⋂i∈N(Xi ∩ [0, y]) = Y ∩ [0, y]. 
We will now prove that reduction commutes with the undo relation: if X→ Y , then Y is the restriction to Y of X .
Lemma 6.8. If X→ Y and x, y ∈ Y then x X y if and only if x Y y.
Proof. Suppose that x X y and let y′ = max(X ∩ [0, y[) so that X ∩ [0, y′] = X ∩ [0, y[ . We ﬁrst claim that y′ ∈ Y (and therefore
Y ∩ [0, y[= Y ∩ [0, y′]). Indeed, by Lemma 5.7 there exists Z ⊆ AX such that Y = X \⋃z∈Z ]f (z), z[ . Assume for contradiction
that y′ 	∈ Y . Then y′ ∈ X∩ ]f (z), z[ for some z ∈ Z . Such a z cannot be greater than y since otherwise we had f (z) < y′ < y < z
against the hypothesis that y ∈ Y . Such a z cannot be smaller than y, otherwise we had z ≤ y′ by z ∈ X and the choice of y′
in X . This is in contradiction with y′ ∈]f (z), z[. Thus, z = y, and by z ∈ Z we deduce y ∈ Z . We have f (y) < x < y by x X y. We
conclude x 	∈ Y , contradiction.
Now suppose that X ∩ [0, y′] /= Y ∩ [0, y′] (otherwise we conclude that x Y y trivially): since y′ ∈ Y , by part (6.7) of Lemma
6.7 we have X ∩ [0, y′]→ Y ∩ [0, y′], so that by (5.6) of Lemma 5.6:
AY∩[0,y′] = AX∩[0,y′] ∩ Y ∩ [0, y′]. (2)
It follows that x ∈ AY∩[0,y′] = AY∩[0,y[, which together with yx implies x Y y.
For the opposite implication, namely if x Y y, we use again equation (2) to infer that x ∈ AY∩[0,y[ ⊆ AX∩[0,y[; we know that
yx, then x X y follows. 
The last step before proving our characterization Theorem is to establish that any reduction X→ Y preserves all inﬁnite
chains of the relation X , if they exist.
Lemma 6.9. If X→ Y and C = {x0, x1, . . .} ⊆ X is an inﬁnite chain w.r.t. X then C ⊆ Y , and C is also an inﬁnite chain w.r.t. Y .
Proof. By induction over the deﬁnition of → .
X → Y : then Y = X \⋃z∈Z ]f (z), z[X for some Z ⊆ AX0 . We prove that C ∩⋃z∈Z ]f (z), z[ = ∅. For contradiction, let xi ∈
]f (z), z[ for some z ∈ Z ⊆ AX
0
, with i = max{j | xj ∈ C ∩ ]f (z), z[ }. Because of the choice of xi, we have z  xi+1: were they
equal, from xi+2xi+1 and xi+1 = z, we immediately had xi+2z, contradicting z ∈ AX0 (no edge crosses z). Thus, z < xi+1.
Claim: either zxi, or xi+1z.
Proof of the Claim Either f (xi) < f (z), or f (xi) ≥ f (z). If f (xi) < f (z), then from xi ∈]f (z), z[ we deduce zxi. If f (xi) ≥ f (z),
then ]f (xi), xi[⊂]f (z), z[, and from xi+1xi we deduce ﬁrst f (xi+1) ∈]f (xi), xi[, then f (xi+1) ∈]f (z), z[ and eventually, from
z < xi+1, also xi+1z.
Proof of point 1 from Claim If zxi, then xi is inactive in X ∩ [0, xi+1[, because it is crossed by z, and z is active in X ∩ [0, xi+1[.
Indeed, no edge crosses z in X , hence, withmore reason, crosses z in X ∩ [0, xi+1[. But the fact that xi inactive in X ∩ [0, xi+1[
is in contradiction with the deﬁnition of xi X xi+1. If xi+1z, we are instead in contradiction with z ∈ AX0 (no edge
crosses z).
We conclude that C cannot intersect any interior ]f (z), z[X with z ∈ AX0 , and therefore C ⊆ Y . From this and Lemma 6.8 it
follows that C is also an inﬁnite chain w.r.t. Y .
X→ Y because X→ V→ Y for some V . By the ﬁrst induction hypothesis C ⊆ V and it is an inﬁnite chain w.r.t. V ; hence
the thesis by the second induction hypothesis.
X = X0→ X1→ · · · for denumerably many Xi, and Y =
⋂
i∈N Xi. By a secondary induction over i and the principal in-
duction hypothesis we know that C ⊆ Xi for all i ∈N, therefore C ⊆ Y . That C is a chain w.r.t. Y is now a consequence
of Lemma 6.8.
We can now characterize the unstable edges of any X as those for which the undo relation is not well-founded.
Theorem 6.10. For any pointing sequence (X , f ),UX is the set of all x ∈ X such that there exists an inﬁnite descending chain
x = x0 X x1 X x2 X · · · .
Proof. By Corollary 5.10 either X = LX or X→ LX . In the ﬁrst case the thesis is just Lemma 6.6. Suppose that X→ L = LX . By
Proposition 6.2 we have UX = UL , therefore UX consists of all x such that there exists an inﬁnite chain x = x0 L x1 L x2 L · · ·.
By Lemma 6.8 this is the same as a chain w.r.t. X , hence if x ∈ UX then there exists an inﬁnite chain x = x0 X x1 X x2 X · · ·
out of it.
Viceversa, if x = x0 X x1 X x2 X · · · is an inﬁnite chain then it belongs to L by Lemma 6.9, so that x = x0 L x1 L x2 L · · ·
is an inﬁnite chain by Lemma 6.8, and we conclude that x ∈ UL = UX . 
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As immediate consequences of the theorem and of Lemma 3.4.3, we can characterize the sets AL , IL ,UL of the limit L of X:
Corollary 6.11. For any pointing sequence (X , f ),AX ∪ IX is the set of all x ∈ X which do not belong to any inﬁnite chain w.r.t. X .
Corollary 6.12. Let (X , f ) be a pointing sequence, and L = LX its limit. Then AL = AX ∩ L is the set of those edges x which are empty
in L and maximal w.r.t. inclusion in AX; IL = ∅, and UL = UX is the set of all non-empty edges in L (if any), that is:
LX = RFL ⇔ UX = ∅.
7. Related works
A primary source of the present research is Coquand’s semantics of evidence for classical arithmetic [13], where the
notion of limit is implicit in the cut-elimination procedure on plays, which is essentially our reduction relation on learning
sequences. More on the relation between cut-elimination on plays and cut-elimination on proofs has been investigated e.g.
in [20].
Pointing sequences are possibly inﬁnite plays in the sense of [2,21,23]. Of these, because of a careful study of the structure
of the replies in a play and of the explicit deﬁnition of the concept of view, the paper [21] is especially relevant to us. A game,
there called “computational arena”, is a set of rules deﬁning the justiﬁcation relation among moves, which are divided into
questions and answers. To deﬁne both a play and positions in a play, the notion of “well formed sequence” is used: it is a
sequence of moves each equipped with a pointer to some previous move in the sequence, but in the case of the ﬁrst one. To
bewell formed, the sequence has to satisfy certain conditions that impose that amove always replies to some previousmove,
and “justiﬁes” this latter, and, more importantly, that Gandy’s “no dangling-question-mark condition” is satisﬁed, namely
that the last asked question is answered ﬁrst.
The latter condition, also called the “bracketing condition” in [2], does not entail that in a well formed sequence cross-
ing edges cannot exist. Consider the arena associated to the type (N → N) → N (using the intuitionistic arrow in place
of the linear one to avoid the use of exponentials, as e.g. in [25]) and the functional F(f ) = f (f (0)). A play where Player
defends F according to a call-by-value strategy does not involve any crossing edge; but if we switch to a call-by-name
evaluation strategy, Player’s reply to Opponent’s question: “what is the value of f (f (0))?” is a question about the value of
the outermost f ; Opponent’s reaction is now asking about its argument, that is the value of f (0), which forces Player to
suspend his answer, continuing with a new question about the value of the innermost f . As soon as the latter comes, the
pointer of Player’s reply to the suspended question crosses Player’s own question about the value of the innermost f . As
a matter of fact the crossed edge disappears in the Opponent view right after, together with all the interior to which it
belongs.
There is a tight connection between the limit of a ﬁnite pointing sequence and the view of a player on turn in a position
of a play of [21]. More, the concept of view remains well deﬁned even for plays of transﬁnite length [7,9], but the idea of
using limits to extract the content of an inﬁnite dialogue seems new, as well as the characterization results we present in
Section 6.
In [12], a preliminary version of [13], the author explicitly hinted at an interpretation of plays and strategies in terms of
learning. The notion of backtracking as a retraction of previous guesses is sketched there, and has been investigated in the
case of 1-backtracking in [8]. In the simpler cases this matches with Gold’s ideas of learning in the limit [17,18] and with
Hayashi Limit-ComputableMathematics [19], though the latter were deliberately limited to classical theorems of low logical
complexity.
To go behind 0
2
problems, in fact, one has to resort to Schubert’s iterated limits [26], which have been proved to cover
exactly the arithmetical hierarchy [14]. With respect to iterated limits and to the latter result we improve by giving a more
direct construction of the limit itself, which seems to be suitable to model more reﬁned strategies as are implicit in actual
non-constructive proofs. Moreover we know that the set of true arithmetical formulas is the limit of a suitable learning
sequence [5], hence the class of learnable sets is not included into any level of the arithmetical hierarchy, so that limits in
the sense of the present paper and iterated limits are non-equivalent concepts: if our conjecture that iterated limits are a
particular case of learning sequences is true, then we have a proper extension of the notion of Schubert.
More preciselywe conjecture that learnable sets are exactly the1
1
sets, and that the sets learnable by a learning sequence
whose undo relation has height k are exactly the 0
k+1 sets.
Gold’s work is considered as the mathematical foundation of algorithmic learning theory, a research area involving
investigations by philosophers and computer scientists, who call it machine learning. Although there exists a large variety
of approaches in the ﬁeld, there are some common traits illustrated e.g. in [24]. The “guesses” of a learning sequence in our
sense can be seen as a training set, where the instances are provided via an “incrementalmethod”. This consists of an “inﬁnite
sequence of evidence items” [27], but differently than in machine learning models, the exhibition of the evidences is caused
by the interaction of the learner with the environment: in our setting she is indeed an active agent, posing questions and
reacting to answers given by the “nature”. On the other hand the environment is supposed to provide honest replies, playing
the role of a supervisor in a training process. It is important to remark that we think of the environment as a reliable actor,
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who might though behave non-deterministically, say because is himself learning from learner guesses, and challenging her
hypothesis in some clever way.
In the setting of the present work the “hypothesis” is that a certain claim is true, namely classically valid (in this sense
we do not have a set of hypotheses nor a bias to restrict the “version space”). But at the same time the learner acquires some
knowledgewhich is the limit in our sense: hence an inﬁnite object is learned, which is actually a function, andwhich belongs
to an inﬁnite set.
The limit is an ideal entity, which is however effectively constructed by the learner, but it is not computable in general,
and it remains implicit in the memory of the learner who in general is not aware that her knowledge has become stable (the
“no bell tolls” for a scientiﬁc discovery of the pragmatist philosopherWilliam James quoted in [27]). Hence in our model the
learner is an “extrapolating machine”, rather than an “inductive inference machine” in the sense of [11]. There is however an
essential difference between ourmodel and those usually considered inmachine learning theory: it is the fact that wemodel
the memory of the learner by recording how her attitude with respect to the hypothesis evolves via a pointing sequence and
the related notion of thread. On the contrary in learning theory the learner is a black box, whose internal states are perfectly
irrelevant. She can change her mind during the learning process, but there is no description of the logical dependance of her
subsequent guesses. This enforces the adoption of a notion of learning in the limit which is just stabilization, at least in the
discrete case. It follows that the “limit” considered in machine learning theory is essentially Gold’s notion, and there is no
room for considering the hierarchy of backtracking as it emerges from the main results of the present paper.
8. Conclusion
We have studied pointing sequences of countable length and deﬁned a notion of limit which is essentially the main
“thread” of the sequence. We motivate our study by the idea of modeling non-constructive reasoning by means a concept of
learning, namely learning sequences and their limits, extending the constructive interpretation from intuitionistic to classical
arithmetic.We also investigate the structure of the limit and show that, when it has a deﬁnite content, there exists ameasure
of its logical complexity, which is an ordinal.
Much remains to be done. First a full characterization of the learnable functions, or sets, is in order: we conjecture that
they are exactly 1
1
concepts, namely that learning sequences are a model of predicative reasoning. Second we could relax
the sequentiality assumption, namely that backtracking to some point implies the retraction of all intermediate points (the
interior of the edge). This could be accomplished by considering partial orders instead of sequences. Learning sequences
are our view of strategies in games, hence they are candidates for interpreting proofs: the limit is then the computational
content of a proof. A formal study of this interpretation is indeed the ﬁnal goal of our study. While seeking that, it is not
secondary to clarify and to further investigate the relation between the proposed interpretation of classical arithmetic and
the topological foundations of machine learning.
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